Finding the New Balance: Rewards Cards After the Visa-Mastercard Merchant Settlement
- Article
For the past two decades, rewards credit cards have relied on a delicate four-way balance: Issuers and their co-brand partners fund rich rewards with interchange economics; consumers “pay” through annual fees, interest and often higher prices passed through by merchants; and merchants swallow acceptance costs in exchange for conversion and ticket lift.
The November 2025 Visa-Mastercard settlement disrupts this equilibrium by giving merchants new tools to say “no” or “not without a fee” to consumers presenting specific card types. This settlement is unfolding alongside a broader set of legal and regulatory developments in Washington that could further reshape credit card economics, underscoring that the rewards model now faces multiple, overlapping sources of pressure.
Below is a breakdown of what’s in the settlement, why it matters, and the questions issuers and co-brand partners should be asking now.
After nearly 20 years of litigation in “In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation,” Visa and Mastercard have agreed to a revised equitable relief settlement with U.S. merchants. Although it still requires court approval and could be appealed, L.E.K. Consulting has summarized some key provisions.
Merchants can choose whether to differentially accept or decline Visa or Mastercard commercial credit cards, all standard consumer credit cards and/or all premium consumer credit cards (where most high-fee/high-rewards products sit). They can make different choices for Visa versus Mastercard, and there will be mandatory visual identifiers on commercial and premium cards to support selective acceptance at checkout.
Merchants may surcharge consumers presenting Visa- or Mastercard-branded credit cards the lower rate of 3% or their cost of acceptance at the brand level or at the individual product level (for example, only premium rewards cards). They can surcharge one card scheme but not another or surcharge schemes differently, and they can surcharge Visa/Mastercard regardless of whether they surcharge American Express or Discover.
Visa and Mastercard commit to reduce the average effective credit interchange rate by at least 10 basis points (bp) for five years. Standard consumer credit cards are capped at 125 bp for eight years.
Merchants can decline premium or commercial cards, conduct A/B testing to gauge customer response by location (e.g., online/offline channel, urban/rural geo, standard/micro store type) and steer within digital wallets under the same rules that apply for plastic cards. They can accept some wallets and not others or enable certain wallets only online.
The settlement explicitly enables merchant buying groups to negotiate interchange and rules collectively. A $21 million education fund will support merchant understanding of the new rule set.
In practical terms, the settlement gives merchants a more granular tool kit for influencing their payment acceptance economics.
Friction at the point of sale (POS), customer pushback and the cost of change mean that wide-scale hard declines of premium cards are unlikely outside a few high-margin or cost-sensitive sectors. More probable early moves are:
As merchants adjust their acceptance and pricing strategies, consumer behavior will play a critical role in determining the real impact — particularly in the current rising-cost environment, which is already trying consumer patience at checkout. Several plausible scenarios emerge.
Scenario A: Consumers absorb occasional surcharges but maintain primary card habits
Assuming surcharging is applied inconsistently and only at selected merchants:
Scenario B: Consumers shift toward standard credit or debit cards to avoid fees
More widespread surcharging or selective declines could accelerate behavioral change:
Scenario C: Consumers become more tender-agnostic and more price-sensitive
If merchant communication at checkout normalizes discussions of payment cost:
Scenario D: Consumers push back, creating reputational or operational risk for merchants
If surcharging or selective acceptance becomes too visible or inconsistent:
Strong customer research will be important for understanding customer behaviors across segments — though we do believe premium cards will always have an important role in the market.
Modest changes may have limited impact, while widespread surcharging or declines could quickly reshape top-of-wallet dynamics.
For issuers, the settlement is less about the headline 10 bp rate cut and more about optionality shifting toward merchants. It introduces new vectors of risk including:
Co-brand partners (airlines, hotel groups, retailers, tech platforms) are exposed in two ways: Their economics are deeply tied to premium card interchange, and their customer experience is closely associated with card usability.
Several potential shifts emerge:
This settlement does not immediately dismantle the U.S. rewards ecosystem. The fee reductions are modest on a systemwide basis, and the behavioral leap required for merchants to actively decline popular premium cards is significant.
However, it does these three important things:
Given that, we suggest the following questions for senior teams.
The settlement is not the end of the story. It is a negotiated compromise in a world where merchant activism, regulatory scrutiny and new payment technologies are all moving in the same direction: more transparency on costs and more leverage for payers of those costs. Issuers and co-brands that start stress-testing their portfolios and customer experience now will be better positioned if and when merchants decide to use the new tools they have just been given.
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